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THE LOGIC OF UNCERTAINTY ACCORDINGl) 
TO J. M. KEYNES 
By Izumi HISHIY AMA * 
I 
I think that one chapter has been left untouched in the studies 
about J. M. Keynes which have been made so far. It is none other 
than the relationships between A Treatise on Probability') and The General 
Theory. Because A Treatise on Probability was Keynes' first painstaking 
work'), I believe in a certain sense that the study of these relationships 
will serve to clarify the changes of his thought from his early days up 
to the latter. 
Though it is to be expected that some would say that setting up a 
proposition like that would be quite meaningless in the case of Keynes, 
I think that even if a doubt of that kind might be aroused, it would be 
natural in the case of Keynes. It seems to me that among all the pro-
minent scholars in the past and present there are few scholars like him 
who have been unsophisticated out of a bad habit of insisting on the 
conventional way of thinking. Of course he has never insisted on his 
own assertions. It is likely that some may dare criticise him, saying that 
he is eccentric. As is well known, in his Treatise on Money, 1930, he 
criticised the formula (the cash balance equation) asserted in his Mo-
netary Reform, 1923, and also in his General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money, 1936, he abandoned the essential part (fundamental equations) of 
his Treatise on Money. He further proceeded to make a severe, if not 
fatal, criticism of the classical economists, among whom he himself 
belonged for a long time and he attempted to extricate himself from their 
field. Viewed from this angle, I would rather think that a deeper develop-
* Professor of Economics, Kyoto University 
1) This paper has the two succeding ones: ,j 'Homo Oeconomicus' in J. M. Keynes' Theory 
of Investment ", Shiso, No. 519, Sept. 1967; and" J. M. Keynes' Logic of Uncertainty and 
Money", Shiso, No. 526, Apr. 1968. 
2) J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, 1921. This book has been reprinted several times 
since 1929. The page numbers which are given to the lines quoted are taken from the 
reprinted edition, 1962, published by Halper & Row. 
3) This book is Keynes' first painstaking work which originally was prepared as a fellowship 
dissertation (1908) of King's College (Cambridge). 
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ment of one's thought would, above all other things, have meant to 
Keynes to criticise the very concept in one's own mind, to make a 
conquest of it and to attempt to extricate oneself from it. 
On the other hand, it is also commonly known that he had some-
thing of the personality of a current critic having an acute realistic sense. 
Thus no point of the vicissitudes of current problems ever escaped being 
timely grasped by Keynes' sharp sensibility. The innumerable variety 
of economic problems which had given rise with bewildering rapidity 
during the period from the end of the World War I to the great depres-
sion, such as the problems concerned with post-war disposal and rehabi-
litation measures, the system of currency and price stabilisation, chronic 
unemployment and depression and what not, together with their resulting 
economic diseases, came into existence, carrying particular phases and 
colours in each case. As it acted in concert with each case, Keynes' 
diagnosis and his prescription slips showed some changes one after the 
other. In this way he never stayed at the same place; just as if he 
were running water. Whatever specific time he may be taken up at, 
we always find him in the posture of a man of thought who is attempting 
to face the future by doing away with the past. In a word, he is, as 
it were, always" a man on his way". If one turns his mind toward the 
past from the viewpoint of such man of thought, the past must have 
reflected on his mind not as what should be taken over but as what 
should be abandoned. The past must be something incomplete or imma-
ture, if not something erroneous. The harder the effort is made to trace 
the changed course of his original thought, the oftener the chances to 
think in that way increase. If viewed from this aspect, it maya ppear 
to be meaningless to make a quest for the relationships between his 
General Theory, which was intimately conceived by Keynes, and his 
Treatise on Probability, which was the crystallisation of his primitive thought. 
In this way this very point in question has been almost left (duly?) 
untouched by those who have been regarded as specialised Keynes 
scholars. Neither L. R. Klein, S. E. Harris, A. H. Hansen nor D. Dillard, 
etc. has made mention of even a few words with respect to the Treatise 
on Probability, not to speak of the above mentioned point in question'). 
Even J. A. Schum peter, who has been so well-known for his profound 
knowledge, did not grasp the meaning of the Treatise on Probability as 
having been anything more than "an outlet for the energies of a 
4) L. R. Klein, The Keynesian Revolution, 1947; D. Dillard, The Economics of Jolm Maynaro 
Keynes, 1948; A. H. Hansen, A Guide to Keynes. 1953; S. E. Harris, John Maynard Keynes, 
Economist and Policy Maker, 1955. 
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mind "5). Because many other scholars one after another have done 
nothing but contribute to the spread of such views, the specific problems 
concerned with a Treatise on Probability have been left untouched, being 
buried in oblivion for the period of thirty years since the publication of 
The General Theory, and there has been at least no room left in any eco-
nomist's concern to be taken up by these problems. 
It may be said that the reason why a Treatise on Probability has been 
disregarded by those who have made a study of Keynes is, not because 
it was immature or that it has been replaced by his own thought in 
later days, but because it was an achievement in a field having nothing 
to do with economics, or because it had no concern whatsoever with the 
formation of his economic thought. Maybe it was assumed that the 
line of thought in terms of a Treatise on Probability and that which has 
penetrated through The General Theory by integrating the thoughts in the 
field of his economics were, so to speak, two parallel lines, neither of 
which would ever cross the other. Or rather, the truth might lie in the 
fact that a Treatise on Probability has never been read, and that those 
specialists interested in this field who perused the theory so happened 
to show no interest in Keynes' economics. Let it be what it may, it is 
anyway an indisputable fact that the re-examination of the part that the 
Treatise on Probability played in forming Keynes' thought, specifically in 
systematising his economic thought has never been attempted before, 
being completely neglected by those who have made a study of Keynes' 
works. And if it can be assumed that such a point in question does 
have some weight which can not be disregarded, then it follows that 
the various studies conducted about Keynes so far are characterised 
by a blind point of a serious nature. As for me, I am of the opinion 
that this point in question should by no means be neglected, and therefore 
my judgement leads to the conclusion that the studies about Keynes 
in the past are not free from such a blind point. 
The Treatise on Probability is not a book that deals with the technique 
and mathematical application of probability as the title may suggest. 
It is a product of a far more extensive and ambitious way of grasping 
the nature and role of probability. Speaking briefly, its aim is to com-
pose a new logical foundation rather than the creation of a new logic 
on the basis of empirical science. Such a way of taking up the problem 
is very clearly expressed in his quoted line of Leipzig's words, which 
may be cited here as follows: "J'ai dit plus d'une fois qu'il faudrait 
une nouvelle espece de logique, qui traiterait des degres de Probabilite." 
(p. 3.) Since the main subject of a Treatise on Probability lies in the clari-
5) ]. A. Schum peter, Ten Great Economists, From Marx to Keynes, 1952, p. 269. 
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fication of 'a new type of logic' (une nouvelle espece de logique) to 
provide a logical basis of empirical science, it would not be entirely 
wrong to say that this book treats the methodology of empirical science, 
if expressed in recent words. Therefore, the relationship between a 
Treatise on Probability and The General Theory can be, in a sense, comparable 
to that between J. S. Mill's System of Logic and his Principles of Political 
Economy, or that between J evons' Principles of Science and his Principles of 
Political Economy. 
For the purpose of making a thorough study of the meanings of J. 
S. Mill's thought on economics it would probably be essential to make 
a close examination of his system of logic. The same should be 
held true with regard to the case of Keynes. That is, for the purpose 
of clarifying the theoretical meaning of his thought on economics deve-
loped in his General Theory it would be necessary to examine his system 
of logic. In the meanwhile, speaking of the system of logic of Keynes, 
there is no such book except his Treatise on Probability, and it can be seen 
that Keynes sacrificed his whole youthful life, when his intellectual 
energies were brought into full play, only to complete this book in 
which he wanted to accomplish the task of creating a new type of logic 
which could well be set up against Mill's system of logic'm. This book 
is not anything like a layman's piece-work, but is literally one of his 
life works'), as commented on by R. F. Harrod. It appears to me, as 
far as my view is concerned, that Keynes' philosophical thought, being 
different from. the case of economic thought, grew to maturity in his 
youthful days and that his systematical thought of logic which bloomed 
in his youth never came to be revised in all his life. In the case of 
Keynes, if described in a more or less exaggerated manner, his philoso-
phical vision with respect to the methodological foundation of his theore-
tical framework came to be established during the period of his earliest 
intellectual formation, and the development of his thought filled with 
seeming diversities and changes that took place afterwards, up to such 
time when his General Theory was published, was something like sparks 
6) Keynes declared in the introduction to A Treatise on Probability that this book was on the 
track of 4 the English tradition', such as Locke, Berkeley, Hume. Mill, Sidgewick. etc., but 
that on the other hand Mill's System of Logic showed a "complete failure to grasp with any 
kind of thoroughness the nature and the importance of the theory of probability" (p. 268, 
note 1). 
7) Keynes devot.ed all his leisure hours to the study of A Treati5e on Probability during the 
period covering 1906-1911, that is, from ~3-~9 years of age. Cf. R. F. Harrod, The Lift of 
John Maynard Key",s. 1951. p. 133. 
8) With respect to A Treatise on Probability. Harrod made the following statement: "His 
treatise :must be regarded as embodying a substantial proportion of his best life-work. It 
would be quite wrong to think of it as jeu d'esprit thrown off by an economist to show 
tbat he had some philosophical capacity also." Ibid •• p. 133. 
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flying apart just before a gigantic lense set in the frame of such a VISIOn 
was about to be focussed on a certain point. It appears to me that 
those who made a study of Keynes in the past have all been dazzled 
too much by such brilliant sparks and that they have failed to recognise 
the other side of Keynes' thought--that element which kept wandering 
in hope of finding a place to settle down, taking root deep in the basic 
layer of his superficially ever-changing thoughts, i.e. that ever-lasting 
philosophical element. 
Be the matter as it may, how suggestive it is that the very first field 
of study from which Keynes set forth to begin his scholastic itinerary 
was principally concerned with the theory of probability and the theory 
of money. To recompose the theory of probability as a fundamental 
logic common to the empirical sciences by straightforwardly accepting the 
uncertainty which spreads its wings in the field of experience as a natural 
and normal element on the one hand, and to make complete research 
of a theory and practice of all monetary phenomena in which uncer-
tainty makes its most prominent appearance in the economic field on the 
other--all these were none other than the subjects of his study to be 
pursued by himself when Keynes launched himself in to the study of a 
science. As already mentioned, it seems that the study of the systematisa-
tion of empirical and inductive logic based on the concept of probability 
was completely finished in his early days, being maintained as such 
without any modification throughout all his life. Contrariwisely, how-
ever, the systematisation in the field of his economic thought, which was 
started from his study of money and which was integrated in a volumi-
nous General Theory, through a series of various works on money and 
banking, was characterised by repeated destruction and creation, criticism 
and reconstruction, being forced to pass through a long painful gestation 
period. Disregarding the danger of too much simplification, if the for-
mation of Keynes' thought is to be briefly and symbolically summarised, 
it can be reduced to the following two fields of systematisation: (1) 
logic based on probability and (2) economics based on money. Now then, our 
present problem is to examine whether or not an everlasting straight 
line originating from probability, and a diversified, and so to speak, spiral 
line originating from money respectively, determine each independent field 
of its own which will never cross the other. Needless to say, I think 
that these two fields are connected by close relationships with each 
other, and that in the intersection of these two lines should lie the raison 
d'efre of a new microcosm, in opposition to the old classical microcosm 
which is composed of Mill's inductive logic and deterministic economics 
mainly concerned with real matters taken over by A. C. Pigou through 
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the ideas held by J. S. Mill and A. Marshall. 
Viewed from this angle, it follows that the system of A Treaties on 
Probability should be regarded as an essential component element of the 
thought of Keynes, being coupled with the system involved in The General 
Theory. Therefore, it can fairly be said that almost all of the scholastic 
studies and literature in the past" which did not take this point up 
deviated from the fundamentally important point in question, if viewed 
both from the standpoint of a far-sighted grasping of the systematical 
thought of Keynes and from the standpoint of the clarification of the 
theoretical meaning of his economic thought. Consequently, the subject 
matter of my present study about Keynes, in brief, can be focussed on 
clarifying that the two above-mentioned different categories of thought, 
or fields, are connected together in meaningful relationships, that the two 
lines originating from probability and money respectively should intersect, 
and still further that his systematised economic thought should be rebuilt 
on Keynes' logic of uncertainty. 
n 
It seems that among Keynes' systematised economic thought concent-
rated in the General Theory, one of the groups of problems which has some 
relationship with the thoughts concerned with the theory of probability 
is the theory of inducement to invest or the theory rif investment decisions, and another 
one of them is the theory rif propensity to consume or the theory of the consumption 
function. Now, as is generally known, since these two problems are no 
more than the essential elements of the so-called principle of effective 
demand, if it could be made clear that these theories are based on a 
consistent ground in terms of the theory of probability, then our assump-
tion that the Keynesian theory of probability has some meaningful 
relationships with his systematised economic thought could be corrobo-
rated. However, even if it is made clear that the theory of probability 
is related to the theory of investment inducements and the theory of 
the consumption function, it does not follow that the way in which the 
relation comes to arise and its nature are exactly identical in both cases. 
In my opinion the theory of probability and the theory of investment 
inducement are directly related, and such a combination is very natural. 
9) As far as my knowledge is concerned, some examples of except tons in which this point 
in question have not been disregarded are seen in the following two works: Yuzo Yamada, 
.. Introduction' About the Keynes' .. Treatise on Probability", in Keynes Research Associa-
tion (ed.l, Studies of Economics of J. M. Keynes (Keynes Keizaigaku Kenkyul, 1950; G. L. S. 
Shackle, The Hedgeiwg and the Fox ;-, .. Keynes and the Natu,e of Human Affairs" in 
his work The Nature of Economic TlwughJ, 1966. 
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The reason is because the problem of investment is concerned with the 
way of selecting a probable course of action under uncertain anticipa-
tion. Putting it another way, because the problem resolves itself into 
a problem of selection or decision under uncertain conditions, the con-
cept of probability comes to be naturally formed in consciousness. Tak-
ing the way of thinking advanced in the General Theory for example, if 
a little more concrete explanation is to be given, it runs as follows. 
Generally speaking, the decision to produce new capital goods, such as 
machines or buildings, will be governed by the production cost and the 
expected market price. Now then, when the price of capital goods is 
expected to exceed production cost, the production of capital goods, i.e. 
investment will be stimulated. In other words, the scale of investment 
will be determined at the level where the price and production cost 
come to be equal. Nevertheless, the price of capital goods depends upon 
two factors: one is the rate of interest and the other is the expectation 
of the future profit from capital goods. When the rate of interest goes 
down, other conditions being equal, the price of capital goods will go 
up, and similarly when the expectation of the future profit turns out 
favourably, its price will also go up. The way in which the price of 
these capital goods fluctuates is a plain fact to be easily understood by 
analogical inference if our eyes are turned to the daily price fluctuations 
of valuable securities, although these are not real assets like machines 
and buildings, which can be looked upon as representative of real capi-
tal assets. Now, if roughly expressed, the rate of interest according to 
Keynes, once the quantity of money is fixed, is determined by the pro-
pensity of the public to hold money. However, various motives of the 
public for holding money in possession for future use are governed by 
the anticipation or judgement with respect to the future. On the one 
hand it is needless to say that the anticipation of future profit from 
capital goods is also to be governed by judgement having an uncertain 
element. Therefore, it necessarily leads to the conclusion from all that 
has been stated that, if the production cost of capital goods is given, then 
investment after all is to be based on two different judgements with 
respect to the future--the preference of the public to hold money in 
possession and their opinion of the future profit from capital goodslO). 
Because these judgements are of an extremely uncertain nature, they 
are not based on safe and definite grounds. Putting it another way, 
in the case of the selection of a course of action, the result of which 
will become known not instantaneously on the spot but more or less in 
10) cr.. J. M. Keynes ... The General Theory of Employment", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
Vol. 51, No.2, 1937, p. 218. 
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the distant future, however complex and confusing its phenomenal form 
may appear to be, it appears to me that the structure of inference based 
on the theory of probability has its roots deep in the background of 
such judgements. Therefore, it can fairly be assumed that the way of 
thinking in terms of the theory of probability is not inessential in Key-
nes' theory of investment inducement or the theory of investment 
decisions, and that there does exist a very close relationship at the very 
bottom of the foundation. 
As to the so-called theory of the consumption function, viewed from 
the chronological sequence of Keynes' thought, it must have been formed 
in his mind as a flashing light in relatively later days, possibly imme-
diately after the publication of the Treatise on Money in 1930. It can be 
assumed that the concept of a fairly stable consumption function must 
have come to his mind through the formulation of an investment-multi-
plier prepared by his student R. F. Kahn"l, as its inevitable assump-
tion, rather than as a result of its by-product. If it is permissible to 
view it in this way, then it may be considered that the theory of the 
consumption function, at least as far as its genetic ground is concerned, 
has nothing to do with the theory of probability. If so, where should 
the relationships between the theory of the consumption function and 
the theory of probability be sought? As to this question, the following 
two points seem to be worthy of note: one is the problem of statistical 
generalisation and statistical stability, the other being the problem con-
cerned with Keynes' way of interpreting the so-called aggregation. 
Now, if seen from the standpoint of empiricism, it would be 
permissible to think that the theory of the consumption function is con-
cerned with a kind of statistical generalisation. If consumption and 
income are grasped as an aggregated quantity of an economy as a 
whole, then the theory of the consumption function would indicate the 
plain fact that the move of aggregate consumption is governed principally 
by the move of aggregate income. Of course, the propensity of the 
public to consume may be affected by a number of factors, such as 
conditions of income distribution, their attitudes toward the future, etc., 
and also by the rate of interest to a certain extent. However, if income 
increases, consumption increases, too, but the rate of the increase of the 
latter is smaller than that of the former. In brief, the increment of 
consumption 6C is always smaller than the increment of income 6Y. 
Moreover the ratio of t::,.C to t::,.Y (this is called the marginal propensity 
to consume) is positive and less than 1. Keynes asserts that this charac-
teristic prescribes the" normal shape of the function of consumption" 
11) R. F. Kahn, U Home Investment and Unemployment ", E~onQmic Journal, June 1931. 
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of a society and it forms the "fundamental psychological law" of an 
economic society'2l. Now then, if the law pertaining to the function of 
consumption, to which the characteristic (it may now be expressed by 
cp) that is mentioned in the above can be ascribed as an inevitable 
conclusion, is grasped as a kind of statistical generalisation, it is clear 
enough that it will be formed on the basis of the theory of probability. 
A statistical law does not so strictly require universal soundness that 
even one exception will lead to its abandonment. For instance, although 
the drawing of a conclusion that all swans are white, based on data 
which show that this or that or those swans are white, may be regarded 
as inductive reasoning in conformity with the classification") of Keynes' 
Treatise on Probability, it should rather be looked upon not as statistical 
induction but as universal induction. In a case of statistical induction 
the proposition to be clarified would show that most swans are white, or 
that the probability that a swan is black is such and such, based on 
data that this or those swans are white and the other one is black. If 
the same reasoning is applied to the law presupposed in the function of 
consumption, the characteristic cp, which prescribes that the marginal 
propensity to consume is positive and less than I, is not necessarily found 
to be true, depending on each individual case. It may so happen that 
all of the increased portion of income may be consumed in one case, or 
that more than the increased portion may be spent in another case. In 
other words it seems that each individual case is governed by a variety 
of arbitrary factors which may transgress the regularity of a law. Ne-
vertheless, when it comes to the aggregate of many individual cases, i.e. 
a large majority phenomenon, the existence of the law comes to be 
clearly accepted, and this can be boiled down to the proposition that 
most of so many cases have the characteristic cpo Or similarly statistical 
generalisation will always arrive at the form showing that "the proba-
bility, that an instance taken at random from series S will have the 
characteristic </>, is p" (p. 412). Viewed from this standpoint, I should 
think that there is room to contemplate the problem of the stability of 
the propensity to consume, on which the stability of the economic system was 
regarded to depend by Keynes, in close relationship with the statistical 
stability in A Treatise on Probability. 
Now, if the concept of the consumption function, thinking that ag-
gregate consumption has a stable relationship with aggregate income, is 
concerned with the existence of a law to be drawn empirically from the 
aggregates, the problem of examining a rational ground for such an 
12) J. M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936, p. 96. 
13) J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, p. 220. 
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empirical generalisation is still left to be clarified. That it is possible 
to confirm the stability of the propensity to consume through a statistical 
procedure is not the answer to the problem; it simply gives its first step. 
It is because the attempt to clarify in a reasonable and a priori way the 
reason why it becomes so is still left untouched. If stated in a slightly 
more concrete manner, it is because whether the relationships of regula-
rity drawn from the aggregated group which is indicated in the function 
of consumption can be consistently connected with the traditional theory 
of the reasonable preference of consumers or not, in other words whether 
it is possible to draw the macroscopic theory of the consumption function 
in a theoretically consistent form from the microscopic theory of consu-
mers' preference or not--such problems, i. e. the so-called aggregation 
problem in contemporary economics--are still left untouched. In his 
General Theory, Keynes did not refer specifically to this problem, and he 
did not solve it, either, though it is natural that he could not. However, 
what is meant by the problem of aggregation, if viewed from a slightly 
wider angle, is none other than the problem of clarifying the logical 
ground for the empirical generalisation observable among aggregates. If 
further put in other words, the problem may also be generally concerned 
with the logical ground for inductive inference. If it is permissible to 
view it in this way, for the reason that in the first place the problem 
of clarifying the logical ground for the inductive inference in general"!, 
including the statistical inference, was one of the main issues in Keynes' 
Treatise on Probability, it would be possible as well to think that the metho-
dological foundation provided by Keynes himself with respect to the 
aggregation problem in contemporary economics had already been per-
functorily given in one sense. 
In the meanwhile, needless to say, the problem of aggregation has 
the nature of being applied not only to the consumption function but 
also to the so-called aggregate supply function, to the investment demand 
function also, and even further to the money demand function or liqui-
dity preference function. Now, as the field of view is widened from the 
market of consumer goods to that of capital goods and further to that 
of securities, it can be seen that uncertainty comes to intervene in the 
behaviour of microscopic economic constituents as an overwhelming ele-
ment which can not be disregarded. Under such circumstances how 
much appropriateness can the traditional microscopic theory, which ge-
nerally disregards uncertainty, or which is based on a plain or tacit 
14) It seems that Part III, 'Induction and Analogy' in A Treatise on Probability and Part V, 
I ~he Foundations of Statistical Inference', particularly Chapter 33, are concerned with 
thIS problem. 
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presuppOSItIon that it is possible to predict uncertainty in a numerically 
measurable form, have as a well-founded basis of the inductive law of 
regularity confirmed empirically from the majority phenomena that have 
taken place in the market? In this connection, G. Ackley states that, 
because the a priori analysis in support of Keynes' consumption function 
(i. e. the theory of the consumers' preference) is no more than "an 
abstract timeless analysis of rational behavior using a minimum of psy-
chological assumptions", it would be impossible to infer a "generalisa-
tion that can be used to predict or describe behavior which is observed 
over time in a changing world."15l Thus, it is interesting that he has 
expressed his frank doubt as to the a priori argument in support of the 
consumption function. Such doubts, I am sure, will grow stronger and 
stronger as his eyes are turned from the market of consumer goods which 
he had in his mind exclusively to the market of capital goods or securi-
ties. Although I can not agree with the Ackley's assertion, drawn from 
his unsophisticated empiricism, which maintains that" the stability······of 
the consumption function can only be established empirically"16l, as to 
the very way the aggregation problem is taken up from the aspect of 
modern economics, I can not help raising a doubt of the same kind as 
that of Ackley. It seems to me that the only reasonable way of solving 
the so-called aggregation problem would be to provide the inductive 
generalisation or inductive inference relating to the behaviour of an 
aggregate with a justifiable ground in terms of the theory of probability by 
straightforwardly and clearly contemplating the uncertainty in the deci-
sion or activity of each individual random member who is a component 
part of such an aggregate. Be the matter as it may, it appears that the 
problem of the confrontation of the microscopic system and the macro-
scopic system is still covered by a thick mist. Viewed from such a way 
of thinking, since it appears that the systematic thought of Keynes' 
theory of probability has some meaningful relationship with the above 
mentioned problem, it would be necessary to make an examination of 
this point in question by going back to A Treatise on Probability. 
m 
To begin with I have to give my answer to one question. That is, 
even if it were a fact that Keynes attached much importance to the 
concept of probability when he was composing his empirical argument, 
such a matter is not one that occurred only in the case of Keynes, and 
15) G. Ackley, Macroeconomic Theory, 1961, p. 220. 
16) G. Ackley, ibid., p. 220. 
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we have still the question, 'Was not the element of uncertainty and the 
concept of probability similarly considered in fact even in the so-called 
classical theories?' Is the relationship between Keynes' theory and the 
theory of probability something fundamentally different in nature, as a 
matter of fact, in comparison with the relationship between the classical 
theory and the theory of probability? I shall give my opinion about 
this question in general here. 
I have a firm belief that classical theories had a full acknowledge-
ment of the point that the element of uncertainty did have a more 
prominent effect on the producers' preference than on the consumers' 
or more so in the market of capital goods than in the market of consu-
mer goods, and still more so in the field of investment than in other 
fields. However, it seems to me that classical economics ordinarily com-
pletely did away with such uncertainty, and by presupposing the so-
called stationary state, or even if they had it in their mind, by presup-
posing that it was possible to grasp it through either the concept of the 
numerically measurable probability distributions or probability, they 
thought that the existence of uncertainty did not call for the necessity 
of making a fundamental modification of the intrinsic nature of their 
basic model characterised by its deterministic nature. 
In the meantime, because it is too commonly known that many 
classical economists used to presuppose the stationary state in their argu-
ments, such a point will not be taken up here, but there is, I think, the 
necessity of making explanation with illustrations about the particular 
point, in a sense to prevent some misunderstanding too, that they in fact 
took the above-mentioned uncertainty into account. For example, A. C. 
Pigou, who succeeded and developed the theories of Marshall, the 
great master of classical theories, advocated in his Economics oj Welfare 
that the uncertainty-bearing on the part of producers should be 
regarded as one kind of independent factor of production, maintaining 
that what investment meant in the actual world, where some future event 
could not be perfectly predicted, was in a sense to expose resources under 
uncertainty17). Now, the uncertainty that supervenes with a certain type 
of investment, according to Pigou's view, is to be manifested in its full 
pia y in a certain probability distribution of the expected gain of the 
investment. He calls it " a scheme of prospective returns." Thus, invest-
ment can not be anything more than getting possession of a certain 
probability distribution which is to be manifested in a scheme of pros-
pective returns, by laying out a certain amount of money in a manner 
17) A. C. Pigou, Till Economics of Welfare, Appendix I, Uncertainty_bearing as a Factor of 
Production, pp. 771-81. 
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similar to the case of betting. Now, it was considered that the degrees 
of probability of each prospective return, making up the component 
element of such probability distributions, could be clearly made known. 
Consequently it follows that the' mathematical expectation' of the pro-
bability distributions in question could be interpreted as being something 
numerically measurable, the mean value of which could be obtainable if 
the product of each prospective return with the probability of attaining 
it was added together. However, the prospective return which ought to 
be a real measure of the uncertainty-bearing should be not the average 
or actually expected rate of return but that amount by which the latter 
exceeds the return of a perfectly safe investment (e.g. consols) 18). In short, 
it should not be something vague and non-measurable but a definite and 
calculable value. 
Thus, the uncertainty element in the field of investment, as far as 
Pigou's view is concerned, is something probable, but because it can after 
all be grasped in a certain and clear probability distribution, he asserts 
that its mathematical expectation is calculable. And so it may be a fair 
guess to say, assuming from his idea of identifying "the most probable 
return" with" the most frequent return "1'), that his thinking is grounded 
on the theory of statistical frequency20) which was integrated by]. Venn. 
However, even if it was assumed that he took the uncertainty element 
into account in the field of production or investment, the frame of his 
deterministic way of thinking with respect to production still remains 
to be as such without being affected at all. The reason is because, 
according to Pigou's way of thinking, this particular element of the 
uncertainty-bearing in the case of investment, is firmly seated in the 
same analytical structure of marginal productivity in the same capacity 
and in an exactly similar manner as in the case of three other factors of 
production, such as nature, labour and capital (i.e. waiting). Therefore, 
if the above-mentioned view of uncertainty is taken, even if the uncer-
tainty arising out of investment for resources is taken into consideration, 
it does not necessarily follow, speaking of the problems of the so-called 
optimum allocation of productive resources, that the nature of the primary 
model which was composed on the condition of certainty should be fun-
damentally modified. Needless to say, if Pigou's point of view is taken, 
the consideration of uncertainty did not come to give any impetus to 
reorganise the deterministic way of thinking into the way of thinking 
18) As to the measure of uncertainty, I decided rather to conronn with Robertson's opinion. 
Cf. D. H. Robertson, Lectures on Economic Principles, Vol. 2, p. 101. 
\9) A. C. Pigou, ibid., p. 774. 
20) See A Treatise on Probability. pp. 93-100 about J. Venn's view. 
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In line with the theory of probability. 
But Keynes is different. The reason is because the foundation-stone 
on which his theory was composed is different, however similar the nature 
of Keynes' way of thinking may superficially appear to be to that of 
the scholars of the classical school. Though paradoxically it may sound, 
even if it were proved how far Keynes' way of thinking is different from 
that of the classical economists, unless such analysis takes up the differ-
ence in the foundation on which respective ways of thinking were ground-
ed, it can not be sufficiently complete. Anyway, Keynes never over-
looked the specific points that classical theories represented by Pigou, 
Edgeworth, etc. did take up; not merely the stationary state, which was 
supposed to be governed by certainty, but the world in which the parts 
to be played by change and expectation was sufficiently taken into considera-
tion, i. e. the system in which uncertainty was taken into consideration. 
However, according to him, in the classical economists' way of thinking, 
"at any given time facts and expectations were assumed to be given in 
a definite and calculable form "21), and he further maintained that, even 
if the uncertainty and risks were recognised, "they were supposed to be 
capable of an exact actuarial computation."") In other words they 
thought that by means of "the calculus of probability" uncertainty 
could be reduced to "the same calculable status as that of certainty 
itself."23) In connection with this Keynes drew a conclusion to the effect 
that such a way of thinking was of the same type as the methodology 
which was adopted in the Benthamite philosophy to calculate pleasure 
and pain, or gain and loss in ethical behaviour. 
Aa far as Keynes' view is concerned, it will lead to the following 
conclusions that, even if it is supposed that the uncertainty element was 
taken into consideration in the way of thinking of the classical econo-
mists, it was presupposed to have been something definitely calculable 
through the concept of numerically measurable probability, that the 
presupposition of mathematical expectation of probability distributions 
with respect to the so-called reasonable economic decision was no more 
than the technique of converting uncertainty into certainty, and that 
through such instrumentality the classical system could not be anything 
else than a system of certainty in which facts and expectations were 
grasped in a calculable and definite form at any given time. Thus, all 
that has been said will lead to the conclusion that the nature of their 
21) J. M. Keynes, .. The General Theory of Employment ", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
1937, pp. 212~13. 
22) J. M. Keynes, ibid., 
23) J. M. Keynes, ibid. 
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system after all has nothing fundamentally different from that type of 
"system in which the amount of the factors employed was given and 
the other relevant facts were known more or less for certain,"") i.e. the 
nature of the model in a stationary state where no uncertainty element 
is involved at all. 
According to Keynes, uncertainty prominent in the field of econom-
ics, especially in the field of investment, is a peculiar characteristic 
inherent not merely in economic phenomena but also in the structure of 
inference underlying empirical science, which is universally unavoidable 
in such human behaviour that is being obliged to make alternative jud-
gements of which the results will more or less show up in the future. 
Especially in the field of economics this characteristic must be substan-
tial as well as decisive. The reason is because among all human beha-
viour which is influenced by the preoccupation with the prospective result, 
one of the most important ones is something of an economic nature, i.e. 
"Wealth" or "the accumulation of Wealth." "The whole object of the 
accumulation of Wealth is to produce results, or potential results at a 
comparatively distant, and sometimes at an indefinitely distant, date. Thus 
. the fact that our knowledge of the future is fluctuating, vague and 
uncertain, renders Wealth a peculiarly unsuitable subject for the method 
of classical economic theory."") 
It appears that Keynes made use, in a very strict sense, of the term 
, uncertainty' which arises in the economic field, particularly in the 
field of accumulation. It is not something which can be grasped by 
means of measurable probability as in the case of the classical theory. 
Since the ratio to win at roulette or in a raffle is calculable probability, 
as is widely known, uncertainty in this sense is different from that which 
is meant by Keynes. Viewed from this angle, it is needless to say that 
the uncertainty which is to be indicated in Pigou's "scheme of prospec-
tive returns" does not belong to genuine uncertainty (in the sense meant 
by Keynes), because in the case of Pigou mathematical expectation is 
calculable. Uncertainty in the real sense of the word is something nei-
ther predictable nor calculable, something to which no measurable pro-
bability or even the concept of probability distribution is applicable. 
Unfortunately, the uncertainty arising in the accumulation of wealth is 
none other than this kind of uncertainty. Thus, viewed from this angle, 
it follows that the classical theory is "one of these pretty, polite tech-
niques which tries to deal with the present by abstracting from the fact 
24) J. M. Keynes, ibid., p. 212. 
25) J. M. Keynes, ibid., p. 213. 
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that we know very little about the future."") In this connection, be-
cause I think it very useful to remember a comment made by D. H. 
Robertson, successor of A. C. Pigou, in which Robertson frankly expressed 
his doubts about his master's analysis, it may be cited here as fol-
lows: "The ultimate uncertainties of the business life are precisely those 
which cannot be insured against or pooled in this way. Indeed it is 
arguable that Pigou's 'scheme of uncertainty' paints too narrow a picture 
of the whole problem, since often the businessman not only does not 
know what point on a 'scheme of uncertainty' he will hit, but has only 
the vaguest idea what the scheme of uncertainty is."") 
What is most important for the problem now under discussion is not 
a theoretically consistent system but how the core of uncertainty in the 
economic field should be prescribed. To the eyes of Keynes it may have 
appeared that those classical economic systems which completely disre-
garded such uncertainty that was beyond the probability-calculation,· 
must have been no more than "market-place idols ", in the sense that 
they did not penetrate to the core of substantial uncertainty inherent in 
economic phenomena, however theoretically consistent they might have 
been in themselves. However, it must be admitted that if our eyes are 
cast upon aggregated economic activities, something of regularity can be 
empirically confirmed from a macroscopic point of view, through the 
mechanism of the market. However, if our eyes are once turned from 
the microscopic view to the foundation of the preferences of individuals, 
we are confronted with an entity of uncertainty as if it were a mollusc 
which we can not take hold of. Thus, we are again confronted with the 
conception of uncertainty which has its root deep in the background of 
the problem arising out of the opposition between the microscopic and 
macroscopic ways of thinking"). 
Now, it seems to me that the difference in the ways of thinking 
with respect to the concept of uncertainty and probability held by 
Keynes and the classical economists can be concretely and straightfor-
wardly seen in the theory of money and the rate of interest. In other 
words it is said that this very difference is in itself an outstanding 
26) J. M. Keynes, ibid., p. 215. 
27) D. H. Robertson, op. cit., p. 105. 
28) About such a point at issue there seems to be a great deal to be 1earned from the logic 
of modem physics, particularly statistical dynamics and the so-called principle of uncertainty. 
But it is needless to say that there is a necessity of making a clear distinction between 
uncertainty in natural phenomena and in human phenomena. (See Kotaro Toyama, Logic 
of Today's Physics (Gendai Butsurigaku no Ronri), 1956, Chapter 3, 'Logic of Statistical Dyna~ 
mies' j Shinichiro Tomonaga, Quantum Dynamics (Ryoshi Rikigaku) , Chapter 9, I State of 
Quantum Dynamics 'J particularly pp. 296-31), The writer owes the reference materials 
and information about the essential problems in today's physics to the advice of Mr. Kajita 
of the Department of Economics, Shiga University. 
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characteristic of the Keynesian theory of inducement to invest or the 
theory of investment decisions, in which the above-mentioned theory is 
included as one train of thought. But, before taking up such a proposi-
tion now, I shall turn to the way of thinking in A Treatise on Probability 
and see how Keynes generally grasped the concept of uncertainty and 
probability. 
IV 
As far as I can see, it appears that the concept of uncertainty or 
probability of Keynes' own creation is expressed in a very vivid manner 
in his criticism of "the theory of statistical frequency" which was ad-
vanced in his Treatise on Probability"). Taking this as a clue, I shall now 
make my approach to this problem. Before going into any further 
discussion, let us not forget that whenever the classical economists took 
uncertainty into account, they grounded their reasoning on the concept 
of objective probability on the presupposition of the theory of statistical 
frequency and the resulting concept of uncertainty which was prescribed 
by it. 
Now, the essence of the theory of statistical frequency can be briefly 
put as follows: Taking the uncertainty-bearing of Pigou already referred 
to as an example, the proposition that the probability of producing a 
prospective return of ¥ 10 by spending ¥ 100 for a certain investment 
is fin, means that this particular investment is one of a group of a great 
number of investments of the same type as the one mentioned--the 
fin ratio of which produces the return of ¥ 10. And it follows that the 
very existence of a series of investments having the frequency of fin to 
produce a prospective return of ¥ 10 is purely an empirical phenomenon, 
and they should be determined exactly in the same way as in the case 
of any other matter of fact. Viewed from this angle, probability is 
something ultimately concerned with a series of certain events in the 
form of frequency in respect of a certain characteristic. Then, the pro-
blems relating to probability come to be something to indicate intensively 
the results of experience (for instance what has been experienced about 
the aggregate of a certain type of investment) 30). 
If based on such theory, probability must be understood to be charac-
terised by an objective frequency which is inherent in the aggregate of 
29) Criticism of the frequency theory developed in A Treatise on Probability (pp. 92-1lO) is, 
if definitely spoken, directed against the view of Venn's Logic 0/ Chance (1st ed., 1866) and 
. the generalised frequency theory', It can be assumed that the latter is principally composed 
of the views held by Whitehead (which was given to Keynes in the form of manuscripts). 
30) Cf.]. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, pp. 94-95. 
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all the cases experienced, and it follows that it should have some defini-
tely known numerical values in all cases rather than that it might have. 
Now, when it is said in our daily argument that there is no knowing 
about probability or that probability is vague, it can fairly be said that 
it is all because of our poor or incomplete knowledge of probability and 
not because of objective probability itself. For example, the reason why 
the probability of a certain type of investment to produce certain pros-
pective returns is not clear is not to be ascribed to the characteristics of 
probability distribution itself of the said investment-returns, but is to be 
ascribed to the incompleteness of our knowledge or information with 
respect to the matter. The reason is, if based on the frequency theory, 
beca use" the probabilities are relative, not to our know ledge, but to some 
objective class, possessing a perfectly definite truth-frequency" (p. 102). 
In other words probability is something provided objectively to the 
events which have been experienced. In a word it means objective proba-
bility. 
What is meant by probability by Keynes differs substantially from 
this. Probability, according to him, is the probability of an inference or 
an argument. It is the probability not of events but of propositions31J. 
As in the case of the frequency theory, probability is not something 
objectively innate to the aggregate of events. It is "in an important 
sense relative to given premisses" (p. 102) as the probability of the conclusion 
of a certain inference. Putting it another way, it is concerned with 
actual or hypothetical information or knowledge which forms the pre-
suppositon of inference. Now, in just as much proportion to the differ-
ence among informations or knowledges on which the presupposition of 
inference is to be formed, the extent of the probability of that proposi-
tion may vary. In short, Keynes' probability is a subjective probability. 
In this sense it is also something concerned with" the degree of rational 
belief" in a proposition. But, it is not something based on inference in 
order to draw a conclusion with "demonstrative certainty" as in the 
case of the geometry of ideal space or a syllogism, though it can be 
called rational belief. It is something based on the "arguments from 
premisses leading to conclusions which are reasonable but not certain," 
(pp. 99, 217), i. e. a probable and reasonable inference. Keynes further 
31) In an argument or inference, supposing that its presumption is made up of any set of 
propositions h, that its conclusion is made up of another set of propositions a, and that the 
degree of rational belief of :the conclusion reached from such presumption h is a, then it 
can be expressed as a/h=a. This fonnula indicates the probability of conclusion a drawn 
from the preswnption h. Thus, probability as conceived by Keynes is the expression of 
rational belief in relation to a certain proposition (Le. a) and it is necessarily based on the 
proposition which comprises the presupposition (h). 
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states that almost all of the empirical sciences and our daily behaviour 
depend on such a probable inference. In this way it is seen that Keynes' 
theory of probability is not something concerned with the nature inherent 
in the objective events in themselves, as in the case of the frequency 
theory, but with the nature of subjective inference with respect to the events. 
In other words it treats the varied degrees of confidence aroused from 
the inference of drawing an uncertain, though reasonable, conclusion. 
Viewed from such a standpoint, what defects could there be in the 
theory of statistical frequency? The concept of probability held in the 
frequency theory is clearly understandable by anybody because of its 
objective and measurable nature, but it can not throw light on the pro-
cess of forming our resonable belief itself. In other words, it can not 
be really useful in making our decision. Now, in the ordinary activities 
of daily life and also in almost all of the empirical sciences, however 
differently they may be characterised in their abstractness, universality 
or consistency, the process of inference based on experience lies deeply 
rooted at the bottom. In short, our activities or sciences are closely 
connected with the process of empirical inference. Moreover, the mean-
ing of such inference can not be after all anything else other than the 
preference for a certain conclusion to be drawn through a reasonable 
procedure from a given presupposition. Thus, fundamentally speaking, 
reasonable inference means reasonable priference, which can be seen in the 
statement made by Keynes to the effect that" probability is the study 
of the grounds which lead us to entertain a rational preference for one 
belief over another" (p. 97). It is needless to say that many of the 
reasonable inferences used in our daily life or empirical sciences aim at 
no demonstrative certainty, but do have a more or less probable nature, 
because there can not be any room to make a preference to 'alternatives' 
in the process of drawing a definite conclusion by demonstration, as III 
the case of geometry. 
In the meanwhile, if the basic nature of probable inference lies in 
determining "which alternatives it is reasonable to prifer" (p. 98), then 
probability comes to be something concerned with the "logical grounds 
of decision" and it leads us to the conclusion that, if such a reasonable 
decision were concealed in the core of our life, then probability would 
be something that comes in contact with the very roots of both ordinary 
life and scientific life. If viewed from such an angle, statistical proba-
bility can not be useful either as "the guide of life" or as "the guide 
of decision" (pp. 6, 96). Moreover," in following it we are not acting 
according to reason" (p. 96). In short, it comes down to the fact that 
statistical probability can not be a sufficient condition for reasonable pre-
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ference. This can well be guessed to be the meaning of Keynes' statement 
to the effect that" We may call a statistical frequency a probability, if 
we choose; but the fundamental problem of determining which of several 
alternatives is logically preferable still awaits solution" (p. 98). 
Nevertheless, what is the reason for saying that statistical probability 
is not sufficient to be made the logical ground of our preference? I shall 
give a further explanation about this point by taking the analysis made 
by Pigou as an example again. Illustrations with respect to a certain type 
of investment which takes a certain type of probability distribution of pro-
spective returns are given in Pigou's analysis. However, there is a risk 
in such a simplification of missing the very core of the decision for invest-
ment, because what is important for anybody who makes the decision to 
invest is the selection among several types of investment. Now then, 
let's suppose that there are so many types of investment and each of 
them has a probability distributions of its own type respectively. Thus, 
what is important for the decision of investors is a selection among so 
many mathematical expectations which are substantiated by their own 
inherent statistical frequency. Then, it follows that each objective pro-
bability distribution (of prospective returns) in correspondence to the 
difference due to the type of investment is taken for granted in this 
case. In other words, it is not put in question how the statistical fre-
quency (objective probability), on which our preference or decision is 
presupposed, comes to be formed. But, when the process through which 
the above-mentioned probability distribution is formed is further analy-
sed, it can easily be understood that a number of factors affect the 
foundation of the' real value' of each statistical probability, which may 
govern our decision in some measure. Therefore, if viewed from subjec-
tive probability, the probability of statistical frequency peculiar to each 
type of investment should be put in question. In othert words the pro-
bability (in the sense held by Keynes) of the proposition, saying that the 
probability of producing a given prospective return through a given type 
of investment is p, should be put in question. Be the matter as it may, 
it is sure enough that the order of the mathematical expectation peculiar 
to each type of investment does not precisely reflect that of the prefer-
ence for the decision to make an investment. It seems to me, as referred 
to before, that Keynes cherished the opinion that the classical economists' 
thoughts were based on Benthamite logic. What is meant by such a 
comment is that even in Benthamism it was presupposed that the order 
of preference for an ethical decision was supposed to correspond precisely 
to that of the mathematical expectations (of the expected virtue or 
pleasure), and that the behaviour-pattern of this type was completely 
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taken over as the foundation of an economic decision by the classical 
economists. Consequently it might be said that if this viewpoint is taken, 
the behaviour-pattern presupposed by Pigou in the background of the 
investment decision is substantially grounded on Benthamite logic"). 
Be the matter as it may, because the mathematical expectations 
substantiated by statistical probability can not be a sufficient condition 
for forming a logical foundation for our decision, there arises a necessity 
of building up a new systematised way of thinking of probability, in 
which all the factors that have been given away for the reason of being. 
subjective or non-measurable from the aspect of the theory of statistical 
frequency should be comprehended. The reason is because such a system 
of thought can only be really useful as a 'logical ground of decision' 
or as a ' guide of life '. Keynes' statement to the effect that "My Trea-
tise is concerned with the general theory of arguments from premisses 
leading to conclusions which are reasonable but not certain" (p. 98) can 
be interpreted in such a way (italic mine). 
In the meantime, probability in the theory of statistical frequency 
is characterised by its clearness and measurableness. Perhaps it is be-
cause of such characteristics that this theory has come to be generally 
accepted. But what really matters lies neither in a clear definition of 
probability nor in the logical consistency of a way of thinking, but in 
finding a logical ground for our decision or preference having its root deep in the 
bottom of our inference. If viewed from such a standpoint, even such 
a problem as to whether the probability of a conclusion of our inference 
is measurable or not is not a substantial matter. However, in many 
instances probability which is concerned with the degree of our rational 
belief is not measurable. Frequently it is something which can not even 
be compared. In a case like this" Nor have we any prima facie indica-
tions of the existence of a common unit to which the magnitudes of all 
probabilities are naturally referable. A degree of probability is not 
composed of some homogeneous material, and is not apparently divisible 
into parts of like character with one another" (p. 30). 
It is, needless to say, with his criticism against the fundamental con-
ception of the classical economists, on the one hand, that Keynes limited 
the meaning of probability very strictly, finding it impossible to grasp 
the real uncertainty in the economic field through the concept of a 
32) The criticism of Benthamite logic comprises the major subject of Chapter 26 (The Ap-
plication of Probability to Conduct, pp. 307-23) of A Treatise on Probability. Keynes came 
to acquire his Wlique view holding that the conduct-pattern in Benthamism is an application 
of the classical probability theory from Principia Ethica written by G. E. Moore, with whom 
Keynes was well acquainted. The criticism of Benthamism developed in this chapter seems 
to have formed the original idea of his later criticism of classical economic thought. 
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measurable and objective probability, but we should not overlook on the 
other hand that such an idea sprang from a motif in A Treatise on Proba-
bility, which maintained that the concepts of uncertainty and probability 
which lie deep in the logical ground for decision or preference were 
neither measurable nor comparable. Leaving the matter as it is, it 
appears to me that Keynes had an idea that the concepts of uncertainty 
or probability in the economic field make numerical comparison impos-
sible in the substantial meaning of the word. If viewed in this way, 
Keynes' sharp criticism in his Treatise on Probability of the theory of 
statistical frequency, the motive of which was to discover the 'logical 
ground for decision', was the first criticism ever made of classical eco-
nomic thought which took up the problem of uncertainty and probability 
in this theory, and at the same time it was consistent in its groundwork 
with his later criticism of classical thought"). 
Another criticism raised by Keynes against the theory of statistical 
probability is his opinion that the concept of objective probability can 
not be a reasonable ground for empirical inductive inference. As already 
mentioned before, to seek' the logical justification' of inductive inference 
in general, including the statistical inference in the concept of probability, 
i. e. to attempt to reinterpret the 'inductive law' in terms of the theory 
of probability, was part of his main subject matter. What is regarded 
as important for this subject matter lies not in whether the way of thin-
king in the theory of statistical frequency has logical conformity or not, 
but whether" the body of probable argument, upon which the greater 
part of our generally accepted knowledge seems to rest can be explained 
in terms of it (the frequency theory)" (p. 109). Can it be possible, as a 
matter of fact, that such an inference can be drawn from the assumption 
of statistical frequency? Keynes gave a negative answer with respect to 
this question after making an examination, for example, of various pre-
suppositions on which the conclusion of Darwin's The Origin cif Species was 
based, which may be quoted as follows: "Not only in the main argu-
ment (in' The Origin of Species '), but in many of the subsidiary discus-
sions, an elaborate combination of induction and analogy is superimposed 
33) Harrod, by asserting in a note contributed to The Life of j. M. Keynes in respect to the 
Treatise on Probability that" in my own person I cannot resist some uneasiness in regard 
to the indefinability of probability. and hanker after some fonn of the Frequency theory" 
CR. F. Harrod, ibid., p. 653) does not agree with Keynes' concept of subjective probability, 
In all likelihood it appears to me that the aforementioned point has something to do with 
the complete neglect of the problem of Wlcertainty meant by Keynes when Harrod presented 
a detenninistic model in his attempt to establish a dynamic economics. As to the point 
that all post-Keynesians have in general deviated from the problem of uncertainty arising 
out of economic decision, with the exception of J. Robinson, it can be added that the sup-
port of Professor Schackle can be much hoped for. Schackle, oft. cit., p. 29. 
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upon a narrow and limited knowledge of statistical frequency. And this 
is equally the case in almost all everyday arguments of any degree of 
complexity. The class of judgements, which a theory of statistical fre-
quency can comprehend, is too narrow to justify its claim to present a 
complete theory of probability." (p. 109) 
Thus, it leads us to the conclusion that the problem of rebuilding 
the logical ground for inductive inference through a new concept of 
subjective probability, instead of statistical objective probability, was 
still left to be solved by Keynes. What forms the main subject of Part 
III of A Treatise on Probability is none other than this problem. Through 
all that has been discussed I have shown the general nature of the con-
cept of uncertainty and probability held by Keynes, in comparison with 
that of objective probability, which had its root deep in the foundation 
of classical thought. Then, it is self-explanatory from the composition 
of the problem briefly stated at the beginning of Section II that how 
the theory of inducement to invest, or the theory of investment decisions, 
maintained by Keynes should be recomposed based on the above men-
tioned new concept of subjective probability is our next problem to be 
solved. 
